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Abstract: Our study is among the first to examine the net asset value (NAV) inflation practices 
of fund managers in China, finding that equity funds bolster their portfolios at quarter-end and 
especially year-end. In support of the NAV inflation hypothesis in China, we further document 
the following: (1) NAV inflation is more profound for the worst-performing fund managers and 
(2) the stocks in which fund managers hold larger stakes exhibit a more marked pattern of price 
inflation around quarter- and year-ends than do other stocks. We also find that closed-end funds 
in China engage in NAV inflation at quarter- and year-ends. 
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Previous studies have highlighted a potential agency problem in the mutual fund industry: 
managers could manipulate quarter- and year-end stock prices by excessively purchasing stocks they 
already hold to bolster fund performance. This practice is commonly referred to as net asset value 
(NAV) inflation, marking up, or “tape painting.” The financial press, rating institutions and regulators 
pay disproportionately high attention to funds’ quarterly and annual performance, which could link to 
the practice of NAV inflation at quarter- and year-end. Fund managers could aggressively buy stocks 
in their portfolios, effectively “borrowing” from future performance to push up current returns. 
Consequently, funds have abnormally high returns at quarter-ends, followed by return reversals at the 
beginning of the subsequent months. 
This trading behavior could have detrimental impacts on the two fundamental aspects of 
financial markets: market liquidity and pricing accuracy (Kyle & Viswanathan, 2008). There has been 
mounting evidence of NAV inflation trades of mutual funds in the United States (Carhart, Kaniel, 
Musto, & Reed, 2002). Subsequent studies provide supportive evidence for hedge funds in the United 
States (Agarwal, Daniel, & Naik, 2011) and for mutual funds in Australia (Gallagher, Gardner, & Swan, 
2009). Most of the studies focus on developed markets but ignore one of the most important emerging 
countries, China, which has the second largest stock market in the world. 
Compared with those well-developed markets, the Chinese market has a short history and 
contends with incomplete regulation, opaque information disclosure, and weak legal enforcement.1 The 
institutional environment is relatively underdeveloped in both the Chinese financial markets and 
external corporate governance mechanisms, since shareholder activism is nearly nonexistent (Jiang, 
Rao, & Yue, 2014). Meanwhile, the legal protection of minority shareholders is especially weak (Allen, 
Qian, & Qian, 2005). Compared with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is weak in terms of impacting policy, focusing instead on 
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maintaining the stability of national economic growth.2 It is critical to understand the behavior of fund 
managers in China and potential impacts on fund performance. Naturally, this makes the Chinese 
market an ideal testing ground for comparing NAV inflation behavior in an emerging and fast-growing 
market to that in developed markets. How different in this respect, if at all, is China from developed 
markets? 
Our study is among the first to examine NAV inflation behavior in China and to explore its 
potential impact on fund performance in the Chinese mutual fund market. We find that fund managers 
in China inflate their end-of-quarter and particularly end-of-year NAVs to boost their returns in the 
current period, leading to return reversals at the turn of the quarter. Further, the analysis shows that, on 
average, fund returns are much higher during the final two trading days at quarter-end than they are 
during the first two trading days of the following quarter, especially for the fourth quarter (i.e., year-
end). In China, a fund’s year-based performance draws high attention from the media, rating institutions, 
and scholars. Managers’ annual compensation packages are partially determined by their ranking 
among their peers at the end of the calendar year.3 It is possible that such year-end ranking incentives 
lead to especially strong NAV inflation at year-end. 
Using the market as a benchmark, we find that the adjusted NAVs of the value-weighted (VW) 
portfolio are marked up by an average of 23 basis points at quarter-end, a markup that is considerably 
larger than that documented in the US market (Carhart et al., 2002) and half the magnitude documented 
in the Australian market (Gallagher et al., 2009). We further show that these patterns are not driven by 
exposure to common factors. Specifically, we investigate the behavior of funds by examining their 
benchmark-adjusted returns based on Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model. We find that the NAV 
inflation effect remains statistically and economically significant. 
Further, we examine whether fund managers who have greater incentives to mark up their 
performance are more involved in NAV inflation practices than their less incentivized counterparts are. 
We investigate this question through two channels. The first is related to the convex relation between 
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past performance and future flows.4 That is, investors make purchase decisions based on a fund’s prior 
performance, but could do so asymmetrically, investing disproportionately more in funds that 
performed very well in the prior period. Therefore, managers of high-performing funds have strong 
incentives to pump up their returns to attract more flows. The second channel is related to the inverse 
relation between the probability of managerial replacement and a fund’s past performance (Khorana, 
1996). Given this inverse relation, fund managers under threat of being replaced increase portfolio 
turnover. For instance, poor performers could tend to pump up their existing holdings to decrease the 
probability of dismissal. 
Prior studies suggest that, in the US markets, funds with the best past performance are more 
actively involved in quarter-end trades (Carhart et al., 2002; Duong & Meschke, 2016). By contrast, in 
the Australian market, poor performers display more evidence of portfolio pumping (Gallagher et al., 
2009). We find that the Chinese market resembles the Australian market more, with poorly performing 
funds, rather than higher-performing funds, engaging in NAV inflation practices. The results could be 
driven by differences between Chinese and U.S. mutual funds, where the former are less sensitive to 
performance ranking than the latter. Jun, Li, Yan & Zhang (2014) find that receiving a five-star 
Morningstar rating does not seem to significantly impact a fund’s future flows. The authors also 
document that high-performing Chinese mutual funds in one period do not attract more fund flows in 
the next period.5 By contrast, the convex relation between performance and flow is found in the United 
States (Chevalier & Ellison, 1997; Gruber, 1996; Ippolito, 1992; Sirri & Tufano, 1998). 
Our study contributes to the literature that studies fund performance on the basis of disclosed 
fund portfolio holdings (Huang, Sialm, & Zhang, 2011; Kacperczyk, Sialm, & Zheng, 2008; Wermers, 
2000). Taking advantage of the holding information in Chinese mutual fund filings, we find that the 
equities in which Chinese active equity funds hold larger stakes show more price inflation around 
quarter- and year-end than do others. This finding thus supports the notion that Chinese fund managers 
are involved in NAV inflation through excessive end-of-quarter and end-of-year stock purchasing. 
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Having extended our analyses to closed-end funds, we find that the NAV inflation pattern 
around quarter- and year-ends also exists for closed-end funds in China. Bhattacharyya and Nanda 
(2012) discuss the pricing of closed-end funds, arguing that NAV inflation should exist among them. 
To the best of our knowledge, we are among the first not only to provide new empirical support for this 
prediction but also to examine NAV inflation in closed-end funds. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature on NAV inflation. 
Section 3 describes the sample and presents summary statistics. Section 4 develops empirical 
predictions. Section 5 analyzes the empirical results of NAV inflation. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Related literature 
Various newspaper articles have reported on the practice of NAV inflation in the United States 
(Hansard, 2000; Hill, 2000; Zweig, 1997; Zweig & McGinty, 2012). Zweig and McGinty (2012) 
suggest that a considerable number of stocks outperform the market—namely, the Standard & Poor’s 
(S&P) 500 stock index—on the final trading day of each quarter but therefore underperform it on the 
following trading day. The authors claim that NAV inflation can explain this abnormal pattern. They 
also indicate that it is difficult for regulators to detect fund managers’ NAV inflation activities without 
the availability of detailed trading records. 
Carhart et al. (2002) were among the first to analyze the NAV inflation of US equity funds. 
Using a sample period between 1985 and 1997, they find that fund returns, net of S&P 500 portfolio 
returns, are considerably larger on the final trading day of a quarter and then reverse the following day. 
Moreover, the authors find that these patterns of return reversal are strongest for the best-performing 
funds. Having considered the work of Carhart et al. (2002) as a quasi-exogenous shock to regulatory 
scrutiny, Duong and Meschke (2016) find that NAV inflation has substantially weakened since the SEC 
filed a fraud indictment against fund managers who were involved in NAV inflation in 2001.6 During 
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their sample period from 1993 to 2006, they document that both winner and loser funds pumped their 
portfolios intensely at the turns of the quarter. 
Prior studies have also documented that hedge funds are involved in NAV inflation. Agarwal 
et al. (2011) argue that, compared with mutual fund managers, hedge fund managers are prone to 
manipulate year-end performance because of their incentive fee compensation structures. The authors 
show that hedge fund returns display a spike in December. Having examined the holding data of hedge 
funds, Ben-David, Franzoni, Landier, and Moussawi (2013) find that the pumping behavior of fund 
managers can significantly distort in stock prices. Using transaction-level trading data, Hu, McLean, 
Pontiff, and Wang (2014) provide confirmatory evidence of NAV inflation among US institutional 
investors. 
Apart from a growing body of empirical literature that studies the impact of NAV inflation on 
fund performance, recent theoretical studies justify the existence of NAV inflation trading and predict 
the consequences. Bhattacharyya and Nanda (2012) develop an equilibrium model in which a fund 
manager’s remuneration is based on the NAV of their funds. They argue that a fund manager’s concern 
with short-term fund performance always provides enough incentive for them to manipulate the closing 
price. Their model also predicts that NAV inflation can lead to decreasing returns to scale because of 
related transaction costs. Bernhardt and Davies (2009) reveal that the price inflation caused by pumping 
trades near quarter-end is interim; thus, a return shortfall can occur in the first trading session of the 
following quarter. 
Less attention has been paid by researchers, regulators, and the media to Chinese fund 
managers’ NAV inflation. To address this gap, this study attempts to examine the evidence of this 
misbehavior in China’s mutual fund industry, an environment that has been less effective and 
competitive than the United States. For example, the penetration of mutual funds in China is much 
lower than that of the United States: the ratio of assets under management (AUM) to the gross domestic 
product is only 11% in China, far lower than 91% in the United States. In Western countries such as the 
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United States, mutual funds are regarded as investment tools, saving tools, and retirement plans. By 
contrast, in Asian countries such as China, investors treat mutual funds mainly as a trading tool.7 
 
3. Data and summary statistics 
3.1. Data 
We obtain mutual fund data from the China Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) 
database, including NAVs, distribution, and total net assets (TNA). We define active mutual funds using 
objective codes8 and the composition of a fund’s total assets. We eliminate exchange-traded funds, 
qualified domestic institutional investor funds and index tracking funds. We exclude mutual funds that, 
on average, hold less than 80% of their total assets in equities (see also Huang et al., 2011; Kacperczyk 
et al., 2008).9 To lessen the influence of new funds with insufficient return histories, we use only funds 
that appear in the CSMAR database more than one year before the end of our sample period.10 The 
final selection criterion reduces the maximum number of mutual funds in our study to 276. Our sample 
period covers January 2, 2004, to December 31, 2013. 
                                                          
7 See the report of Asian mutual funds by Ernst & Young LLP in 2016, http://www.ey.com/Publication/ 
vwLUAssets/ey-mutual-funds-ready-for-the-next-leap/$FILE/ey-mutual-funds-ready-for-the-next-leap.pdf. 
8 We select mutual funds that have the following objective codes in the CSMAR fund database: Fund Type ID 
S0501 and Category ID IsETF = 2, IsQDII = 2, and IsIndexFund = 2. 
9 It is worth mentioning that our mutual fund data could suffer less from three kinds of biases that often occur in 
US mutual fund databases. The first is the backfill bias that is often associated with incubator funds (Evans, 2010). 
Incubation is a process via which a fund family provides several funds with seed money to develop a return history. 
At the end of the incubator period, the best-performing fund will be made public and will be included in the 
databases with a favorable return history, whereas unsuccessful incubated funds will be closed or merged, their 
past returns never being recorded in databases. This approach leads to an upward bias in mutual fund returns. 
Such incubation bias may not arise in our database, however, because all Chinese mutual funds must make public 
reports about their establishment to the CSRC. The second bias relates to the incompleteness of data for small 
funds (Elton, Gruber, & Blake, 2001). In the United States, funds with under $15 million in assets do not need to 
report their NAVs daily. If they survive, they will be recorded in the database with their return history; otherwise, 
they may never appear in the database. However, at the inception, the size of a fund will not be extremely small 
in China. The third bias is the survivorship bias in mutual fund databases (Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson, & Ross 
1992). For instance, when using the January 2013 Morningstar database to download 10 years of returns, funds 
that existed in 2003 but did not survive until 2013 were excluded. This resulted in obvious biases in the first and 
second moments and cross-moments of the return. As previously shown in Table 1, all open-end funds in the 
CSMAR database were still alive at the end of our sample periods.  
10 For a robustness check, we added back those funds with less than a year’s history to our sample, with the 
findings still holding. Then, because the CSRC defines an equity fund as a mutual fund that invests at least 60% 
of its total assets in stocks during our sample period, we relax our criteria of a fund investing 80% in the stock 
markets to 60%. The 60% threshold allows for a larger sample, with up to 459 funds at the end of 2013. Our 





Equity funds in China invest mainly in Chinese A-shares11  listed on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE).12 We obtain stock data from the CSMAR 
databases, including the daily market returns of A-shares listed in the SHSE and SZSE, daily stock 
returns, total share numbers, total market values, and the book value of total shareholder equity. We use 
the one-year fixed-term deposit rate set by the Chinese government as a proxy for the return risk-free 
rate obtained from the CSMAR.13 To match the sample period of our mutual fund study, our stock 
market data also span the period from January 2, 2004, to December 31, 2013. 
 
3.2. Summary statistics 
Table 1 shows that, during our sample period, the number of active equity funds increased from 
13 in 2004 to 276 in 2013. Total AUM increased from 25 billion yuan in 2004 to 1.052 trillion yuan in 
2007, followed by a decrease to 774 billion yuan. The VW gross return on the portfolio of active funds 
reached a peak of 106.26% per annum in 2006, with a lowest return of -55.68% per annum in 2008. 
This mirrors the Chinese stock market, which experienced a dramatic uptrend in 2006 followed by a 
sharp drop in 2008. The volatile performance of active funds reflects China’s turbulent stock market. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 2 shows returns to the VW and EW portfolios of active funds, as well as their 
characteristics. Our sample includes up to 276 distinct funds and 333,194 daily fund observations from 
January 2, 2004, to December 31, 2013. Panels A and B respectively report the monthly and daily net 
and gross returns of the VW and EW actively managed equity mutual fund portfolios. On average, the 
monthly VW gross return (0.96%) is slightly higher than the corresponding EW gross return (0.74%). 
This finding implies that large funds outperform small funds in China. In sharp contrast, prior studies 
                                                          
11 We include stocks listed in both the Small Medium Enterprise Board and the Growth Enterprise Board, hosted 
by the SZSE. 
12 A-shares are only available to domestic Chinese investors and are denominated in RMB, while B-shares are 
only available to foreign investors and are denominated in Hong Kong dollars on the SZSE and in US dollars on 
the SHSE. Nevertheless, in 2001, B-shares were available to domestic investors who had foreign currency 
accounts. 
13 The Ministry of Finance in China usually issues bonds that have terms longer than three years and the supply 





document that small funds outperform large funds in the US market (e.g., Chen, Hong, Huang, & Kubik, 
2004). 
Panel B of Table 2 reports the average age, TNA, expense ratio, cash, and stock positions of 
the portfolio of active funds in China. The average age is 4.59 years, which is significantly lower than 
the average age of US funds (16.08 years according to Huang et al., 2011), while the average annual 
expense ratio for equity funds is 2.84% per annum, considerably higher than the average of 1% in the 
US market (French, 2010). Average TNA is 4.56 billion yuan during the sample period of 2004 to 2013, 
which is lower than the average TNA of US equity funds ($1.182 billion during the sample period of 
1998 to 2008). The average cash proportion is 9.29%, while the average stock proportion is 84.07%.14 
By compaararison, US active equity funds invest more in stocks (92.67%) and less in cash (5.60%) 
(Huang et al., 2011). The rest is invested in bonds and other securities. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
3.3. Common factors 
To measure fund performance, we construct value, size, and momentum factors (Carhart, 1997; 
Fama & French, 1993) based on Chinese stock market characteristics. At the end of June of each year 
t, the SHSE and SZSE A-shares are sorted into two size groups based on the total market value of all 
of the tradable A-shares on these exchanges. Then, within each size group, stocks are allocated to three 
book-to-price (B/P) ratio equity groups: growth (i.e., bottom 30%), medium (i.e., middle 40%), and 
value (i.e., top 30%). The B/P ratio in year t is defined as the book value of equity per share in year 
t - 1, divided by the end-of-year closing price in year t - 1. The reason for not using the book-to-market 
ratio—as Fama and French (1993) do—is that Chinese listed companies usually issue multiple class 
shares. Since these shares have the same cash flow and voting rights, they have a similar claim on the 
book value of a company’s shareholder equity. To lower the influence of multiple shares, we calculate 
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the B/P ratio as the book value of shareholder equity per A-share divided by the A-share price (Xu & 
Zhang, 2014). 
The intersection of the size and value sorts creates six VW portfolios (S/L, S/M, S/H, B/L, B/M, 
and B/H), which are updated each June. The momentum factor is constructed similarly to the value 
factor, except that we sort on past returns instead of the B/P ratio and the momentum factor sort is 
updated monthly instead of annually. At the end of each month t - 1, stocks are sorted into three 
momentum portfolios (up, medium, and down) based on the 30th and 70th percentiles of the past 11 
months’ cumulative returns to the end of month t - 2. The intersection of the size sort for the most recent 
June and the momentum sort creates six VW portfolios, which are updated monthly. 
The market factor is calculated as the VW returns of tradable A-shares minus the risk-free rate. 
The market value of tradable A-shares at the end of day t - 1 is used to calculate VW daily returns (with 
cash dividends reinvested on day t). The size factor, SMB, is the difference between the average of 
returns on the three small stock portfolios (S/L, S/M, and S/H) and the average of returns on the three 
big stock portfolios (B/L, B/M, and B/H). The value factor, HML, is the difference between the average 
of returns on the two value portfolios (S/H and B/H) and that on the two growth portfolios (S/L and 
B/L). The momentum factor, UMD, is the simple average of returns on the two up momentum portfolios 
minus that on the two down momentum portfolios. 
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the returns of the market, value, size, and momentum 
factors from 2004 to 2013. The average monthly return of the market factor is the highest, at 1.24% per 
month (t-value = 1.46). The average monthly return of the size factor is 0.864% per (t-value = 2.01), 
which suggests a size premium in the Chinese stock market (Xu & Zhang, 2004). The average daily 
returns of the value and momentum factors are small and insignificant (0.14%, t-value = 0.50, and 
0.12%, t-value = 0.35, respectively). 





3.4. Risk-adjusted returns 
 We compute the VW and EW returns of the portfolio of active domestic equity funds, where 
the returns are weighted by the fund’s AUM at the end of the prior month. We calculate the daily 
market-adjusted returns (𝑅𝑚𝑓,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡,𝑡) as the daily net returns of the fund portfolio minus the daily 
VW returns of the Chinese stock market, including all of the tradable A-shares listed on the SHSE and 
SZSE. We also use Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model to evaluate funds:15 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖(𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑚𝑖𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡,           (1) 
where the dependent variable 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 is the return on fund i for day t minus the risk-free rate (the 
one-year fixed-term deposit rate) and the independent variables are the returns on the market, size, value, 
and momentum portfolios. The excess market return is 𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡  (the return on a VW market 
portfolio of tradable A-shares in the SHSE and SZSE minus the risk-free rate); 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 , 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 and 
𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 are the Chinese versions of the size, value, and momentum factors of Carhart (1997) and Fama 
and French (1993). The average return 𝑎𝑖 is left unexplained by those factor models and 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the 
residual. 
4. Hypothesis development 
The inflation of NAV is a typical agency problem between fund managers and investors. Fund 
managers are concerned about the fund’s TNA because their compensation is usually a fixed proportion 
of it (Bhattacharyya & Nanda, 2012). Thus, managers might want to manipulate fund performance to 
attract more fund flows and enlarge their fee base and remain employed.16 The performance–flow 
relation indeed serves as an implicit incentive contract for fund managers (Chevalier & Ellison, 1997). 
However, as equity claimants of a mutual fund, investors always expect value-maximizing decisions 
from fund managers (Fama & Jensen, 1985) and holders are more concerned with fund returns than 
                                                          
15 In untabulated analysis, we also measure fund performance by abnormal returns calculated from the capital 
asset pricing model of Lintner (1965) and Sharpe (1964) and from the Fama–French (1993) three-factor model. 
The results, quantitatively similar, are available upon request. 
16 Kane, Santini, and Aber (1991), Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992), Smith (1978), and Spitz (1970) find 





fund flows. The separation of interests and the information asymmetry between the two parties therefore 
leads to an agency conflict. Since fund investors cannot observe the exact timing of trades and 
consequent transaction costs, they must bear the corresponding agency costs (Kacperczyk et al., 2008). 
Previous studies examine NAV inflation by detecting fund return reversal patterns around 
quarter-ends. If fund managers mark up their portfolios, fund returns are expected to be abnormally 
high at quarter-end and abnormally low at the beginning of the subsequent quarter. First, Bhattacharyya 
and Nanda (2012) predict that the excessive trading volume along with NAV inflation boosts a mutual 
fund’s short-run performance at the expense of long-run performance because of incurring costs. Fund 
managers’ NAV inflation incentives also result in decreasing returns to scale in the presence of 
transaction costs. Second, Bernhardt and Davies (2009) document that excessive NAV inflation at the 
period end has a short-term price impact; each following period thus starts with a return deficit. This 
leads to the following hypothesis. 
H1: The pumping behavior of equity fund managers inflates their NAVs, which results in 
earning abnormally high returns toward the quarter- and year-end, followed by abnormally 
low returns the following quarter and the start of the next year. 
Carhart et al. (2002) hypothesize that the best performers in the past year have more incentives 
to inflate their NAVs; the authors find that these top-performing funds do pump up their stocks very 
aggressively, given the convex relation between past performance and future flows.17 Mutual fund 
investors usually reward funds for stellar performance with higher flows but do not reduce flows 
proportionally to underperformance. Therefore, the best-performing funds can exploit profits from 
further rank improvements through NAV inflation, especially because they know that they are unlikely 
to be top-performing funds the following year.18 
In contrast to the managers of the best-performing funds, the managers of the worst-performing 
funds are faced with the threat of dismissal due to the inverse relation between the probability of 
                                                          
17 For the nonlinear fund performance–flow relation, please also refer to Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Goetzmann 
and Peles (1997), Gruber (1996), Ippolito (1992) and Sirri and Tufano (1998). 
18 See also Brown and Goetzmann (1995), Carhart (1997), Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994) and Hendricks, Patel, 





managerial replacement and past fund performance (Khorana, 1996). In the presence of this 
replacement–performance relation, underperforming fund managers are more likely to engage in NAV 
inflation at each quarter-end to increase the perceived fund performance. The incentive behind this 
behavior is consistent with that of selling funds that increase the risk toward year-end (Brown, Harlow, 
& Starks, 1996). Moreover, Bhattacharyya and Nanda (2012) show that the volume of pumping trades 
increases with the level of concern regarding short-term performance. Compared with other managers, 
the worst-performing fund managers are more likely to engage in NAV inflation because of magnified 
career concerns at the end of an evaluation period. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis. 
H2: Compared with median-performing equity funds, the best- and worst-performing equity 
funds are pumped up more at quarter- and year-end. 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Market-adjusted performance at the turn of quarters 
This section tests whether those mutual funds that are involved in quarter-end (and especially 
year-end) NAV inflation consequently experience deteriorating performance at the beginning of the 
subsequent quarter. If NAVs are inflated at quarter- and year-end, we should expect abnormally high 
returns around the quarter-end and abnormally low returns around the beginning of the subsequent 
period. We show direct evidence of return reversal patterns around quarter-end that are consistent with 
the NAV inflation hypothesis. 
Table 4 reports the market-adjusted returns of the portfolio of active domestic equity funds 
around the turn of each quarter-end. We calculate the market-adjusted returns as the daily net returns of 
the portfolio of equity funds minus the daily market return. In Panels A and B, Ret End is the average 
of the funds’ market-adjusted returns on the final two trading days of each quarter and Ret Beginning 
is the average of the market-adjusted returns on the first two trading days of the subsequent quarter; Ret 
Difference is the difference between Ret Beginning and Ret End at the turn of each quarter. 
Table 4 shows that, on average, the market-adjusted return of the VW (EW) fund portfolio is 





points) at the beginning of the following quarters; the overall effect is thus negative. The fourth quarter 
shows the strongest reversal pattern. Over only two working days around the year-end, the drop in 
market-adjusted returns is -71.55 (-65.45) for the VW (EW) fund portfolio at the 1% level of 
significance.19 We then test whether those mutual funds that are involved in quarter-end (and especially 
year-end) NAV inflation consequently experience deteriorating performance at the beginning of the 
next quarter period. If NAVs are inflated at quarter- or year-end, we expect abnormally high returns 
around the end of the period and abnormally low returns around the beginning of the subsequent period. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
5.2. Model-based performance at the turn of quarters 
5.2.1 Across quarters 
Next, we use the Carhart (1997) four-factor model to evaluate the fund’s portfolio performance. 
Let 𝑋𝑚𝑓,𝑡 denote the daily market-adjusted returns and the Carhart (1997) model-based daily abnormal 
returns of the VW and EW portfolios of equity funds on day t (where t is from January 2, 2004, to 
December 31, 2013). We run the following ordinary least squares indicator variable regression: 
𝑋𝑚𝑓,𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑌𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑌𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 + 𝑎3𝑄𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝑎4𝑄𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 + 𝑎5𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝑎6𝑀𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 + 𝜀𝑚𝑓,𝑡 ,      
(2) 
where 𝑌𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 is one if 𝑡 is the final two trading days of December; 𝑌𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 is one if 𝑡 is the first 
two trading days of January; 𝑄𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡  is one if 𝑡 is the final two trading days of March, June, or 
September; 𝑄𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡  is one if t is the first two trading days of April, July, or October; 𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 is one 
if t is the final two trading days of any other month but not the last day of a quarter; and 𝑀𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 is one 
if t is the first two trading days of any other month but not the first day of a quarter. 
The results are summarized in Table 5. Panel A reports the NAV inflation effect based on the 
two-day window around period ends. We find strong NAV inflation effects at quarter- and year-end, 
                                                          
19 We find that the VW and EW fund portfolio results are quantitatively similar. For brevity, we do not tabulate 





but no such effect in other months. Of the four coefficients on 𝑌𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 and 𝑄𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 in Panel A, all are 
in the predicted direction and statistically significant at the 10% level. This evidence supports our 
hypothesis that equity fund managers manage NAV inflation at quarter-end, leading to abnormally high 
returns. The price impact of NAV inflation is considerable; for example, the market-adjusted returns at 
quarter-end add up to 91.40 basis points per year, which is much higher than the returns documented in 
the US equity fund market (Carhart et al., 2002). 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
With the mutual fund industry in China still in its early stages of development, there is a great 
need for relevant laws and regulations to be further developed and legal enforcement strengthened. 
Information disclosure is not comprehensive. For example, fund managers in China do not describe 
their investment styles, provide information on fees, or report transaction costs clearly in their 
prospectuses. All of these elements make it easier for a fund manager to pump up his or her portfolio 
among peer groups in China. 
In China, the media, rating institutions, and scholars pay sharp attention to a fund’s year-based 
performance. Fund managers are evaluated and rewarded through a ranking mechanism, with their 
compensation packages being partially dependent on their ranking among peer competitors at the end 
of the calendar year. Performance rankings at year-end are potential drivers of portfolio pumping, as 
evidenced by the quarter-end rise and next-day decline, especially pronounced at year-end. 
Regarding the beginning of each quarter and year, there are no significantly positive 
coefficients. Since excessive NAV inflation trades give rise to higher transaction costs, fund managers 
mark up short-term performance at the expense of future returns. Along with the temporary effect of 
inflation trades, low returns at the start of the quarter are consistent with our prediction as well. In 
addition, NAV inflation effects around the remaining month-end are weak. All four coefficients on 
𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 and 𝑀𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡  are relatively small in absolute values and none are statistically significant, 
indicating that end-of-month effects are not present. 
Panel B of Table 5 enlarges our test window of NAV inflation from two days (before/after) to 





window; for example, the coefficients on 𝑌𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 are not significant, regardless of whether we use 
market-adjusted returns or abnormal returns. This evidence is consistent with the theoretical prediction 
of Bernhardt and Davis (2009). They argue that the price impact of NAV inflation trades at quarter-
ends arises only in the short term, since short-run performance will decrease with subsequent cash 
inflows, which leads to lower long-run performance. Empirically, Brown, Sotes-Paladino, Wang, and 
Yao (2017) and Carhart et al. (2002) find NAV inflation in the US fund market through one- and two-
day window tests, respectively. Thus, if we expand our test window to a longer period, the NAV 
inflation effect will disappear accordingly. 
5.2.2 At each quarter 
 To differentiate the NAV inflation effect at each quarter, we expand our model in Table 6 and 
regress the dependent variable 𝑋𝑚𝑓,𝑡  on 10 dummy variables to test quarter-end seasonality: 
𝑋𝑚𝑓,𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑌𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑌𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 + 𝑎3𝑄1𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝑎4𝑄1𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 + 𝑎5𝑄2𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝑎6𝑄2𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 +
              𝑎7𝑄3𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝑎8𝑄3𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 + 𝑎9𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝑎10𝑀𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 + 𝜀𝑚𝑓,𝑡,                 
 (3) 
where 𝑌𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 is one if 𝑡 is the final two trading days of December; 𝑌𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡  is one if 𝑡 is the first two 
trading days of January; 𝑄1𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 is one if 𝑡 is the final two trading days of March; 𝑄1𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 is one if 
t is the first two trading days of April; 𝑄2𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 is one if 𝑡 is the final two trading days of June; 
𝑄2𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡  is one if t is the first two trading days of July; 𝑄3𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 is one if 𝑡 is the final two trading 
days of September; 𝑄3𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡  is one if t is the first two trading days of October; 𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 is one if t is 
the final two trading days of any other month but not the last day of a quarter; and 𝑀𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡  is one if t 
is the first two trading days of any other month but not the first trading day of a quarter. 
 To see the average quarter-end NAV inflation effect, we also report the regression results of 
All - QEND (the average of 𝑌𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 ,  𝑄1𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 ,  𝑄2𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡  and  𝑄3𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 ), which are the final two 
trading days of each quarter, and All - QBEG (the average of 𝑌𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 ,  𝑄1𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 ,  𝑄2𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 , 





A (𝑌𝐸𝑁𝐷/𝑌𝐵𝐸𝐺 ), Panel B (𝑄1𝐸𝑁𝐷/𝑄1𝐵𝐸𝐺 ), Panel C (𝑄2𝐸𝑁𝐷/𝑄2𝐵𝐸𝐺 ), Panel D (𝑄3𝐸𝑁𝐷/
𝑄3𝐵𝐸𝐺), Panel E (All - QEND)/(ALL - QBEG), and Panel F (𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐷/𝑀𝐵𝐸𝐺) of Table 6. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Our results show that fund managers are inclined to pump up fund portfolios at the end of the 
second, third, and especially fourth quarter rather than the first quarter. For the two-day window results, 
all the coefficients on 𝑌𝐸𝑁𝐷  are positive and significant at the 5% level; the model-based fund 
abnormal returns are significant and positive for 𝑄3𝐸𝑁𝐷. Moreover, the coefficients on 𝑄2𝐸𝑁𝐷 are 
positive and significant at the 5% level when the dependent variables are the market-adjusted fund 
returns. In contrast, none of the coefficients on 𝑄1𝐸𝑁𝐷 are significant. On average, the quarter-end 
market-adjusted performance of fund portfolios is abnormally high: it is equivalent to 23 basis points 
per two days for the fund portfolio. The findings provide further evidence of NAV inflation trades 
(particularly at year-end) and strong subsequent return reversal patterns at the beginning of the year. 
We also expand our study window to five days around the end of each period and find that the NAV 
inflation effect barely exists, supporting the hypothesis that the price impact of NAV inflation is 
temporary, which is consistent with the work of Bernhardt and Davis (2009), Brown et al. (2017), and 
Carhart et al. (2002). We thus opt to use the two-day window in our remaining tests. 
 
5.3. How the best and worst performers perform at the turn of quarters 
The previous section provided evidence of NAV inflation in the Chinese markets. This section 
takes a step further to examine subgroups of equity funds, namely, the best- and worst-performing funds. 
On the one hand, the best-performing fund managers are likely to inflate the prices of stocks held in 
their portfolios to benefit from the convex performance–flow relation (Ippolito, 1992; Sirri & Tufano, 
1998). In other words, those managers who are in a tournament can profit more from improving their 
ranking. On the other hand, the worst-performing fund managers face the possibility of dismissal at 






For each working day t from January 4, 2005, to December 31, 2013, we sort all equity funds 
into quintile portfolios based on their cumulative return over the prior 243 trading days, ending day t – 
2.20 Funds with the worst performance the prior year are assigned to the first quintile portfolio (the loser 
portfolio, P1), funds with median performance are assigned to the third quintile portfolio (the medium 
portfolio, P3), and the funds with the highest performance are assigned to the fifth quintile portfolio 
(the winner portfolio, P5). The difference test between P5 (P1) and P3 entails examining the return 
differences between the winner (loser) portfolio and the medium group, which is calculated as the return 
of the winner (loser) portfolio less the return of the median performance portfolio. 
 We run daily market-adjusted returns and abnormal returns for the mutual fund portfolio, as 
well as the return differences on the quarter- and year-end indicator variables using equation (4). The 
results are presented in Table 7. The coefficients are arranged into panels: YEND/YBEG in Panel A, 
QEND/QBEG in Panel B, and MEND/MBEG in Panel C. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Among the quintile portfolios, the loser fund portfolio shows considerable quarter- and year-
end NAV inflation. There is a strong return reversal pattern for both the market-adjusted returns and 
the model-based abnormal returns of the loser portfolio at the turn of the year in Panel A, with abnormal 
returns (losses) amounting to 19 basis points (-17 basis points). In addition, the coefficients on 𝑄𝐸𝑁𝐷 
in Panel B are positive and significant at the 1% level for the loser portfolios. Moreover, the difference 
test of the 𝑌𝐸𝑁𝐷 and 𝑄𝐸𝑁𝐷 coefficients between P1 and P3 suggests that the loser portfolio earns 
around 16 basis points (16 basis points) greater abnormal returns than the median performance portfolio 
at the year-end (quarter-end). The findings suggest that, compared with medium-performing fund 
managers, the worst-performing fund managers are actively involved in NAV inflation at quarter- and 
year-end in the Chinese market. Gallagher et al. (2009) document that, in the Australian market, poor 
performers display greater evidence of NAV inflation practices. Similar to the Australian evidence, our 
                                                          





evidence suggests that the worst performers, rather than the best performers, are involved in buying 
their existing positions and pumping up prices. 
By comparison, more than half of the 𝑌𝐸𝑁𝐷 and 𝑄𝐸𝑁𝐷 coefficients from the difference test 
between P5 and P3 are insignificant. The economic magnitude is also slightly lower: the winner funds 
show about eight basis points (10 basis points) more abnormal returns than the median performance 
funds at year-end (quarter-end). The findings provide little evidence of the best-performing fund 
managers engaging in NAV inflation trades, which is inconsistent with the US evidence (Carhart et al., 
2002; Duong & Meschke, 2016). Prior studies of the US market document that, due to the convex 
relation between performance and flow, fund managers have stronger incentives to pump up the existing 
holdings of the best performers. Our analysis implies that flows in China are less sensitive to 
performance ranking than their US counterparts seem to be. This difference could be due to the fact that 
the increasing numbers of funds available every year in the United States dilute flows away from those 
best performers, whereas the opposite is true in China: the expansion of the fund industry cannot keep 
pace with the substantial increases in flows.21 
 
5.4. Holding-based analysis 
This section conducts a holding-based analysis, an approach that is widely used in empirical 
research to measure mutual fund performance (Huang et al., 2011; Kacperczyk et al., 2008; Wermers, 
2000). NAV inflation activities indicate that equities in which mutual funds own substantial stakes 
should be more subject to the inflation effect around quarter- and year-end (Hu et al., 2014). Thus, we 
take advantage of the semiannual filings of important stock holdings of Chinese mutual funds from the 
CSMAR database to examine the stock price inflation pattern around period ends.22  In June and 
December of each year, we rank all the stocks (based on their ownership ratio) held by Chinese active 
                                                          
21 One might wonder about whether the worst-performing funds (P1) would benefit more if only the best-
performing funds (P5) pumped up the stocks that they hold, since they do not bear the cost of pumping. If those 
non-pumpers absorbed the positive externality from the behavior of pumpers, then we should observe the middle 
quintile portfolios (i.e., P2, P3, and P4) having as strong a NAV inflation pattern as the worst-performing funds 
(P1). This is, however, not the case, which lessens this concern. 





mutual funds into five quintiles. The institutional ownership ratio is calculated as the share price for 
each security times the number of shares held by mutual funds, divided by the security’s total market 




= 𝑎0𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑡 + 𝑎1𝑌𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑌𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 + 𝑎3𝑄𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝑎4𝑄𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 + 𝑎5𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝑎6𝑀𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑞,𝑡,                                                                                                                                                                       (4) 
 
where indicators YEND, YBEG, QEND, QBEG, MEND, and MBEG are defined as in previous sections, 
𝑋𝑞,𝑡 is the VW average of these stock returns in quintile q, and 𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑡 represents the daily VW returns 
of the Chinese stock market, including all tradable A-shares listed in the SHSE and SZSE. 
In Table 8, we find strong stock price inflation effects around quarter- and year-end for the best-
performing portfolio (P5) and almost no such effects in relatively low ownership portfolios. The 
coefficients on 𝑌𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 and 𝑄𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡  are in the predicted direction and are statistically significant at the 
5% level. Moreover, we observe that NAV inflation effects around the remaining month-end are almost 
insignificant. This evidence of the price inflation of held stock further supports our previous findings 
on NAV inflation practices in the Chinese mutual fund industry; it also confirms that fund managers in 
China are involved in NAV inflation through the excessive purchases of stocks that they already hold, 
particularly those stocks in which they own large stakes. 
Further, the holdings-based analysis can, to some extent, remove the concern that the 
abnormally high fund returns at quarter- and year-ends documented in this paper are consistent with 
reporting manipulation. Although reporting manipulation is illegal in China and fund managers are 
required by the CSRC to guarantee the truthfulness and correctness of the holdings disclosure, this 
possibility cannot be ruled out, given the fact that the Chinese fund markets are at such an early stage 
of development. If the inflation effects were evident mainly in reported fund returns (and not in the 
prices of the stocks held by the funds), then that would imply that our findings in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 





evidence of price inflation of held stocks, which indicates that our findings may be driven more by 
portfolio pumping. 
 [Insert Tables 8 here] 
5.5. Closed-end fund analysis 
 This section carries out the NAV inflation test for Chinese closed-end funds. Bhattacharyya 
and Nanda (2012) predict that portfolio pumping biases skew NAV measures upward and state that the 
logic of portfolio pumping should apply to closed-end funds as well. Although the number of Chinese 
closed-end funds is small (88), we are still interested in seeing what happens to then around quarter- 
and year-ends. We obtain closed-end fund data from the CSMAR fund database and rerun model (2) 
for Chinese closed-end funds from the beginning of 2004 to the end of 2013. Table 9 reports that the 
closed-end fund portfolio shows substantial quarter- and year-end NAV inflation, with returns ranging 
from 5.38 basis points to 92.60 basis points. The magnitude of NAV inflation at quarter- and year-ends 
from the model-based abnormal returns for closed-end funds is similar to that for open-end funds in the 
previous section. Further, the presence of NAV inflation in closed-end funds indicates that the fund 
flow-performance relation might be a less important motivation for NAV inflation than previous studies 
have indicated. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
5.6. Summary 
 Overall, our results support the hypothesis that the pumping behavior of Chinese fund 
managers inflates their NAVs, which leads to abnormally better performance toward quarters-ends and 
especially year-ends, which is followed by abnormally worse performance in the subsequent quarter 
and the beginning of the next year. In the meanwhile, this NAV behavior is more prevalent among the 
worst-performing fund managers. Additionally,  the NAV inflation patterns found in the holding-based 






Given the relatively less developed nature of regulation of the Chinese capital market compared 
to the US market, it is natural to expect Chinese fund managers to be actively involved in NAV inflation 
close to their performance evaluation periods. We provide strong evidence that Chinese actively 
managed domestic equity funds are pumped up at the quarter-ends, particularly at year-ends. Our 
findings remain robust to using both market-adjusted and model-based abnormal performance measures. 
Specifically, we find that fund portfolios exhibit abnormally high end-of-quarter returns and a 
subsequent decrease at the start of the next quarter, which is consistent with NAV inflation behavior. 
We show that these patterns are stronger for the worst-performing funds, which could have greater 
incentives to avoid potential penalties. Our findings are further supported by fund holding tests and 
closed-end fund tests. 
Our findings have several important implications for Chinese investors, policy makers, and 
regulators. Our study is among the first to empirically examine the NAV inflation behavior of mutual 
funds in the Chinese market. In the United States, the pivotal paper about NAV inflation by Carhart et 
al. (2002) caused the SEC to take regulatory action regarding this now-illegal behavior; since then, 
NAV inflation among US equity funds has decreased substantially (Duong & Meschke, 2016). In 
contrast, researchers, regulators, and the press in China have paid little attention to fund managers’ 
NAV inflation. Generally, NAV inflation distorts security prices from their natural levels and raises 
trading costs. Although the price distortions resulting from NAV inflation are short term around quarter-
ends, their influence could be large, due to the prevalent use of NAV inflation across the Chinese mutual 
fund industry. It is thus important to design sophisticated methods to detect this behavior. Beyond the 
scope of this study, further research is warranted to look into the use of fund trading data to examine 
NAV inflation in China’s mutual fund industry more directly. Trade data can be used to record and 
scrutinize fund managers’ purchase or sale orders executed in the final trading session of each quarter 
(Gallagher et al., 2009). 
The return reversal pattern that we document at the turns of quarters provides an appealing 





back at the beginning of the following quarter, other investors can earn abnormal returns through selling 
(buying) fund shares at the last (first) trading session of each quarter. In particular, as the year draws to 
a close, fund investors who cash out can potentially make considerable profits at the expense of those 
who buy into mutual funds. However, given that actively managed mutual funds levy a redemption fee 
and impose restrictions on frequent trading, investors could find it difficult to exit from or enter into 
mutual funds flexibly. Thus, it is still uncertain whether they can exploit the effect of a fund manager’s 
NAV inflation behavior. 
Our findings also highlight the important role for Chinese financial regulators in improving the 
disclosure quality in the Chinese mutual fund industry through increasing the frequency of required 
complete disclosures.23 Broadly speaking, more frequent disclosure helps improve the liquidity and 
transparency of financial markets (Agarwal, Mullally, Tang, & Yang, 2015). Specifically, more 
frequent disclosure requirements help fund investors and regulators to more effectively monitor fund 
management. Frank, Shackelford, and Shoven (2004) and Ge and Zheng (2006) find that more frequent 
disclosure enables fund investors and regulators to discover and punish any fund manager misbehavior. 
Therefore, we suggest that, in addition to the semiannual disclosure of full holdings, Chinese fund 
managers should be required to file their complete portfolio holdings with the CSRC in the quarterly 
report toward the end of both the first and third quarters of each year. However, the potential costs of 
frequent disclosure should also be considered; for instance, a fund’s valuable research conclusions and 
private information could be used by its competitors as soon as the detailed portfolio compositions are 
disclosed.24 
Further, it would be interesting to examine whether funds with a non-Chinese clientele 
operating in China behave differently from the funds that are the focus of this study. This would help 
in disentangling manipulation reporting from portfolio pumping (since those funds may have less 
incentive to distort reporting). Due to the unavailability of data, we leave those important issues for 
future research.25 
                                                          
23 We summarize the disclosure requirements of fund portfolio holdings in China in Appendix B. 
24 Various costs of frequent disclosure are discussed in detail by Wermers (2001). 
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Table 1 Summary statistics by year 
This table presents the numbers of active equity funds, equal-weighted (EW) and VW net and gross 
returns (in percent), and the TNA under management in the Chinese market each year from 2004 to 
2013. Gross daily returns are calculated as daily net returns plus 1/244th of a fund’s total annual expense 
ratio. Here TNA represent the average of yearly TNA under management, in billions of yuan. The 
sample includes active equity mutual funds that hold more than 80% in the domestic stock market and 
that were made public at least one year before the end of the sample period. Qualified domestic 
institutional investor funds, index funds, and exchange-traded funds are excluded. 
 
Year No.      
VW Return EW Return  TNA               
(bill yuan) 
Gross  Net  Gross  Net  
2004 13 -6.47 -7.93 2.88 1.15 25 
2005 33 0.73 -1.10 1.52 -0.30 34 
2006 73 106.26 103.76 86.54 84.26 133 
2007 110 56.19 52.69 48.07 44.64 1052 
2008 134 -55.68 -57.53 -53.75 -55.71 867 
2009 175 68.54 65.05 63.52 59.74 942 
2010 208 -3.57 -5.97 -1.13 -3.87 959 
2011 245 -25.77 -27.89 -25.70 -28.04 835 
2012 276 4.66 2.30 4.98 2.17 738 






Table 2 Fund returns and characteristics 
Table 2 reports the gross and net returns (in percent) of the portfolio of Chinese actively managed equity 
mutual funds. The monthly returns are presented in Panel A; the corresponding daily returns are 
summarized in Panel B. The daily gross returns are calculated as the daily net returns plus 1/244th of a 
fund’s total annual expense ratio, while the monthly gross returns are calculated as the monthly net 
returns plus 1/12th of a fund’s total annual expense ratio. Panel C reports the fund age, TNA, expense 
ratio, and stock proportion of the mutual fund portfolio. Here, TNA, reported in billions of yuan, is the 
TNA under management at the end of each quarter. The cash ratio is calculated as the cash held by a 
fund divided by the fund’s total assets at the end of a year. The stock ratio is calculated as the market 
value of stocks held by a fund divided by the fund’s total assets at the end of a year. The annual expense 
ratio is reported as a percentage. The sample includes 333,194 daily fund observations from January 2, 
2004, to December 31, 2013. 
Variable 
  
Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max 
  
Panel A: Monthly Returns (in percent) 
VW 
Gross 0.96 7.49 -20.52 1.60 18.83 
Net 0.76 7.50 -20.68 1.33 18.57 
EW 
Gross 0.74 6.98 -20.56 1.51 15.99 
Net 0.53 6.98 -20.73 1.22 15.75 
Panel B: Characteristics  
Age (years) 4.59 2.37 1.00 4.00 10.00 
TNA (billions of yuan) 4.56 5.20 0.03 2.71 54.02 
Expense Ratio (percent per year) 2.84 1.20 0.10 2.60 12.71 
Cash Ratio (percent)  9.29 3.86 0.14 9.35 24.13 






Table 3 Summary statistics for the daily and monthly explanatory returns of the Fama–French three 
factors and Carhart four factors in the Chinese stock markets 
Panel A reports the Chinese daily time series averages of the cross-sectional summary statistics for each 
Carhart (1997) four-factor variable from January 2, 2004, to December 31, 2013. The variable 𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡 is 
the return on a VW market portfolio of Chinese stock, including all tradable A-shares listed in the SHSE 
and SZSE, and 𝑅𝑓 is China’s daily risk-free rate, based on the one-year fixed-term deposit rate or the 
one-year Treasury note issued by the Chinese government. The construction of the value factor (𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡) 
and the size factor (𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡) follows Fama and French (1993); the construction of the momentum factor 
(𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡) follows Carhart (1997). At the end of June each year t, the SHSE and SZSE A-shares are sorted 
into two size groups. The so-called small group includes SHSE and SZSE tradable A-shares whose June 
total market value (including both tradable and non-tradable shares) is below the median total market 
value for SHSE and SZSE A-shares and the big group includes stocks with total market capitalization 
above the median. The SHSE and SZSE A-shares are also allocated to three book-to-price (B/P) equity 
groups: growth (in the bottom 30% of the B/P ratios of the SHSE and SZSE A-shares), neutral (in the 
middle 40% of the B/P ratios of the SHSE and SZSE A-shares), and value (in the top 30% of B/P ratios 
of the SHSE and SZSE A-shares). The B/P ratio of A-shares for June of year t is the book value of 
equity per share in year t - 1, divided by the year-end closing price of the A-shares in year t - 1. The 
intersection of the size and value sorts creates six VW portfolios, which are refreshed at the end of June 
each year during the sample period. The market values of all tradable A-shares are used to calculate the 
VW daily returns. The size factor return, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡, is the daily difference between the simple average of 
returns on the three small stock portfolios (S/L, S/M, and S/H) and the simple average of the returns on 
the three big stock portfolios (B/L, B/M, and B/H). The value factor return, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡, is the daily difference 
between the simple average of returns on the two value portfolios (S/H and B/H) and the simple average 
of returns on the two growth portfolios (S/L and B/L). The momentum factor return, 𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 , is 
constructed like 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡, except that it is sorted on past returns instead of B/P, and the momentum factor 
sort is updated monthly instead of annually. At the end of each month t - 1, the SHSE and SZSE A-
shares are sorted into three momentum portfolios (low, medium, and high) based on the 30th and 70th 
percentiles of the SHSE and SZSE A-shares in the past 11 months of cumulative returns to the end of 
month t - 2. The intersection of the size sort for the most recent June and the (independent) momentum 
sort creates six VW portfolios, which are updated monthly. The momentum factor return, 𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡, is the 
simple average of the day t return on the two high-momentum portfolios minus that on the two low-
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Panel A: Monthly Explanatory Returns 
Mean (%) 1.24 0.23 1.02 0.86 0.14 0.12 
St. Dev. 
(%) 
9.36 0.05 9.37 4.68 3.08 3.63 
Skewness -0.09 0.69 -0.10 -0.31 0.24 -0.07 
t-Value 1.46 47.47 1.19 2.01 0.50 0.35 
Panel B: Daily Explanatory Returns 
Mean (%) 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.01 
St. Dev. 
(%) 
1.85 0.00 1.84 0.77 0.57 0.71 
Skewness -0.31 0.68 -0.32 -0.78 0.08 -0.16 










Table 4 Turn-of-quarter market-adjusted fund returns 
This table reports the market-adjusted returns of Chinese actively managed domestic equity funds 
around each quarter-end. In Panel A, we calculate the daily market-adjusted returns as the daily net 
returns of the VW portfolio of Chinese actively managed domestic equity funds minus the daily VW 
returns of the Chinese stock market, including all tradable A-shares listed on the SHSE and SZSE. The 
results of the EW fund portfolio are reported in Panel B. The variable Ret End is the average of the 
funds’ market-adjusted returns on the final two trading days of the quarter, whereas Ret Beginning is 
the average of the market-adjusted returns on the first two trading days of the following quarter. We 
calculate Ret Beginning net of Ret End at the turn of each quarter as Ret Difference. The averages of 
Ret End, Ret Beginning, and Ret Difference across all the quarters are also reported. The maximum 
number of China’s active equity mutual funds in this study is 276. The market-adjusted returns are 
reported in basis points. The sample period is January 2, 2004, through December 31, 2013. The t-
statistics of Ret Difference are reported in parentheses. 
 
Panel A: VW Market-Adjusted Returns 
Quarter Ret End    Ret Beginning Difference t-Value 
Q1 21.13 -6.46 -27.59 (-1.17) 
Q2 18.62 9.94 -8.68 (-0.24) 
Q3 0.29 -21.40 -21.69 (-0.91) 
Q4 16.80 -54.75 -71.55*** (-3.83) 
Average 14.21 -18.17 -32.38** (-2.38) 
Panel B: EW Market-Adjusted Returns 
Quarter Ret End    Ret Beginning Difference t-Value 
Q1 15.55 -13.07 -28.62 (-1.01) 
Q2 37.07 8.50 -28.57 (-0.92) 
Q3 -2.95 -22.81 -19.86 (-0.75) 
Q4 17.13 -48.32 -65.45*** (-4.18) 









Table 5 Model-based abnormal returns of the portfolio of equity funds around the month-end 
This table reports the fund portfolio performance based on Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model. The 
dependent variable 𝑋𝑚𝑓,𝑡 in each regression is the daily market-adjusted returns and the Carhart (1997) 
four-factor model is based on the daily abnormal returns of the VW portfolio of Chinese actively 
managed domestic equity funds. We calculate the daily market-adjusted returns as the daily net returns 
of the fund portfolio minus the daily VW returns of the Chinese stock market, including all tradable A-
shares listed in the SHSE and SZSE. For each mutual fund in the sample, we also calculate its daily 
abnormal returns, which are the residuals for the Carhart (1997) four-factor version of regression 
estimated on the fund’s daily net returns. The sample includes open-end equity funds in China that hold 
more than 80% in the domestic stock market and that were made public at least one year before the end 
of the sample period. Qualified domestic institutional investor funds, index funds, and exchange-traded 
funds are excluded. The maximum number of mutual funds in this study is 276. The regression 
specification is as below: 
 𝑋𝑚𝑓,𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑌𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑌𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 + 𝑎3𝑄𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝑎4𝑄𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 + 𝑎5𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝑎6𝑀𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 + 𝜀𝑚𝑓,𝑡 
The dependent variable 𝑋𝑚𝑓,𝑡 is regressed on the following binary indicator variables: 𝑌𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 is one 
when 𝑡 is the final two trading days of December; 𝑌𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡  is one when 𝑡 is the first two trading days 
of January; 𝑄𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡  is one when 𝑡  is the final two trading days of March, June, or September; 
𝑄𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡  is one when t is the first two trading days of April, July, or October; 𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 is one when t is 
the final two trading days of any other month but not the last of a quarter; and 𝑀𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 is one when t is 
the first two trading days of any other month but not the first of a quarter. The returns are reported in 
basis points. Each regression has 2,424 daily return observations from January 2, 2004, to December 
31, 2013. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels of significance, respectively. Panel B: Same as Panel A, except that the indicator variables 
















Panel A: Two-Day (Before/After) Window 
  a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 
Market adjusted       
Coefficient 17.60** -52.40*** 24.60** -3.63 8.63 -6.17 
t-Value (2.23) (-3.52) (2.57) (-0.35) (1.44) (-1.09) 
Carhart       
Coefficient 9.66*** -8.46 6.43* 8.66 3.55 4.02 
t-Value (2.88) (-0.84) (1.85) (1.56) (0.94) (1.28) 
Panel B: Five-Day (Before/After) Window 
Market adjusted       
Coefficient 3.33 -33.40*** 13.60** -4.20 3.50 -9.50** 
t-Value (0.55) (-3.69) (2.02) (-0.68) (0.79) (-2.39) 
Carhart       
Coefficient 1.17 -4.89 0.87 3.67 1.46 -0.20 







Table 6 Market-adjusted and abnormal returns of the fund portfolios around the period end 
The model is 
𝑋𝑚𝑓,𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑌𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑌𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 + 𝑎3𝑄1𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝑎4𝑄1𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 + 𝑎5𝑄2𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡  + 𝑎6𝑄2𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 +
 𝑎7𝑄3𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝑎8𝑄3𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 + 𝑎9𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝑎10𝑀𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 + 𝜀𝑚𝑓,𝑡. 
The dependent variable 𝑋𝑚𝑓,𝑡  in each regression is the daily market-adjusted returns and Carhart 
(1997) model-based daily abnormal returns of the VW portfolio of Chinese actively managed domestic 
equity funds. We calculate the daily market-adjusted returns as the daily net returns of the fund portfolio 
minus the daily VW returns of the Chinese stock market. For each mutual fund in the sample, we also 
calculate its daily abnormal returns, which are the residuals for the Carhart (1997) four-factor version 
of the regression estimated on the fund’s daily net returns. The dependent variable 𝑋𝑚𝑓,𝑡 is regressed 
on 10 binary indicator variables:  𝑌𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡  is one if 𝑡 is the final two trading days of 
December; 𝑌𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡  is one if 𝑡 is the first two trading days of January; 𝑄1𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 is one if 𝑡 is the final 
two trading days of March; 𝑄1𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 is one if t is the first two trading days of April; 𝑄2𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 is one if 
𝑡 is the final two trading days of June; 𝑄2𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 is one if t is the first two trading days of July; 𝑄3𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 
is one if 𝑡 is the final two trading days of September; 𝑄3𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 is one if t is the first two trading days 
of October; 𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 is one if t is the final two trading days of any other month but not the last of a 
quarter; and 𝑀𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 is one if t is the first two trading days of any other month but not the first of a 
quarter. The term ALL - QEND (the average of 𝑌𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡, 𝑄1𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡, 𝑄2𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡, and 𝑄3𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡) is the final 
two trading days of each quarter; ALL - QBEG (the average of 𝑌𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 ,  𝑄1𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 , 𝑄2𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 . and 
𝑄3𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡) is the first two trading days of each quarter. For the five-day window results, the indicator 
variables are extended to five days instead of two days around each period end. The coefficients are 
arranged into panels: 𝑌𝐸𝑁𝐷/𝑌𝐵𝐸𝐺 in Panel A, 𝑄1𝐸𝑁𝐷/𝑄1𝐵𝐸𝐺 in Panel B, 𝑄2𝐸𝑁𝐷/𝑄2𝐵𝐸𝐺 in 
Panel C, 𝑄3𝐸𝑁𝐷/𝑄3𝐵𝐸𝐺 in Panel D, and (ALL - QEND)/(ALL - QBEG) in Panel E. The results are 
reported in basis points. Each regression has 2,424 daily return observations from January 2, 2004, to 
















  Market Adjusted Carhart 
Panel A: Turn of the Year 
YEND/YBEG Coefficients 
Two-day window (-2, +2) 18**/-52*** 10***/-8 
Five-day window (-5, +5) 3/-33*** 1/-5 
Panel B: Turn of Quarter I 
Q1END/Q1BEG Coefficients 
Two-day window (-2, +2) 24/-4 -1/8 
Five-day window (-5, +5) 10/-10 1/3 
Panel C: Turn of Quarter II 
Q2END/Q2BEG Coefficients 
Two-day window (-2, +2) 46**/12 5/14 
Five-day window (-5, +5) 21/1 2/5 
Panel D: Turn of Quarter III 
Q3END/Q3BEG Coefficients 
Two-day window (-2, +2) 4/-19 15***/4 
Five-day window (-5, +5) 9/-3 -1/3 
Panel E: Turn-of-Quarter Average 
(ALL - QEND)/(ALL - QBEG) Coefficients 
Two-day window (-2, +2) 23***/-15* 7***/5 







Table 7 Fund returns on year-to-date returns around the month-end 
The regression is as below: 
𝑋𝑚𝑓,𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑌𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑌𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 + 𝑎3𝑄𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝑎4𝑄𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 + 𝑎5𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝑎6𝑀𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 + 𝜀𝑚𝑓,𝑡. 
For each trading day t from January 4, 2005, to December 31, 2013, we sort Chinese actively managed 
domestic equity funds into quintile portfolios based on their total returns over the prior 243 trading days 
ending day t – 2. Funds with the lowest year-to-date returns are assigned to quintile 1 and funds with 
the highest are assigned to quintile 5. The dependent variable 𝑋𝑚𝑓,𝑡 in each regression is the daily 
market-adjusted returns and the model-based daily abnormal returns of each portfolio. We calculate the 
daily market-adjusted returns as the daily net returns of the fund portfolio minus the daily VW returns 
of the Chinese stock market. For each mutual fund in the sample, we also calculate its daily abnormal 
returns, which are the residuals for the Carhart (1997) four-factor versions of the regression estimated 
on the fund’s daily net returns. The difference test, P5 - P3 (P1 - P3), is calculated as the quintile 5 
(quintile 1) portfolio returns minus the quintile 3 portfolio returns. The number of mutual funds in this 
study is 276. The dependent variable 𝑋𝑚𝑓,𝑡 is regressed on the six dummy variables: 𝑌𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡  is one if 
𝑡 is the final two trading days of December; 𝑌𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡  is one if 𝑡 is the first two trading days of January; 
𝑄𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 is one if 𝑡 is the final two trading days of March, June, or September; 𝑄𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 is one if t is the 
first two trading days of April, July, or October; 𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 is one if t is the final two trading days of any 
other month but not the last of a quarter; and 𝑀𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 is one if t is the first two trading days of any other 
month but not the first of a quarter. The coefficients are arranged as panels: YEND/YBEG in Panel A, 
QEND/QBEG in Panel B, and MEND/MBEG in Panel C. The results are reported in basis points. ***, 















Portfolio Market Adjusted Carhart 
Panel A: Turn of the Year 
YEND/YBEG Coefficients 
P1 (Loser) 23***/-63*** 19***/-17* 
P2 8/-59*** 5/-18* 
P3 6/-43** 3/-1 
P4 17**/-54*** 11***/-10 
P5 (Winner) 14/-40** 11**/1 
   
P1 - P3 17*/-20** 16*/-15 
P5 - P3 7/4 8/3 
Panel B: Turn of Calendar Quarters 
QEND/QBEG Coefficients 
P1 (Loser) 33***/9 16***/19*** 
P2 25***/-6 9**/5 
P3 18/-5 1/5 
P4 24**/12 6/21* 
P5 (Winner) 26**/-1 11**/6 
   
P1 - P3 16**/15* 16***/14** 
P5 - P3 8/4 10*/1 
Panel C: Turn of Months Instead of Quarter-Ends 
MNED/MBEG Coefficients 
P1 (Loser) 16**/-1 8/7 
P2 13*/-8 6/2 
P3 8/-6 1/5 
P4 10/-7 5/4 
P5 (Winner) 5/-9 1/3 
   
P1 - P3 8**/5 6/2 







Table 8 Abnormal equity returns around the month-end 
In June and December of each year, we rank all stocks held by Chinese active mutual funds 
based on their ownership ratio into five quintiles (P1 to P5). The institutional ownership ratio 
is calculated as the share price for each security times the number of shares held by the mutual 
fund, divided by the security’s total market value. The VW average of these stock returns in 
quintile P is 𝑋𝑞,𝑡. The variable 𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑡 represents the daily VW returns of the Chinese stock 
market, including all tradable A-shares listed in the SHSE and SZSE. For each quintile, we run 
the regression 
𝑋𝑞,𝑡 = 𝑎0𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑡 + 𝑎1𝑌𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑌𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 + 𝑎3𝑄𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝑎4𝑄𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 + 𝑎5𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 +
𝑎6𝑀𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 + 𝜀𝑞,𝑡, 
where 𝑌𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 is one when 𝑡 is the final two working days of December; 𝑌𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡  is one when 
𝑡 is the first two working days of January; 𝑄𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 is one when 𝑡 is the final two working days 
of March, June, or September; 𝑄𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡  is one when t is the first two working days of April, 
July, or October; 𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 is one when t is the final two working days of any other month but 
not the last of a quarter; and 𝑀𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 is one when t is the first two working days of any other 
month but not the first of a quarter. The returns are reported in basis points. The t-statistics are 




YEND YBEG QEND QBEG MEND MBEG 
P1 (low) -30.40 0.35 -22.60* -10.90 -20.70* -11.50 
 (-1.41) (0.01) (-1.75) (-0.71) (-1.85) (-0.97) 
P2 -16.50 3.43 -14.10 10.50 -16.80* -8.25 
 (-0.81) (0.13) (-1.10) (0.75) (-1.98) (-0.86) 
P3 -17.60 5.01 -8.41 9.08 -9.69 -6.01 
 (-1.05) (0.22) (-0.79) (0.73) (-1.25) (-0.75) 
P4 4.18 -9.61 8.08 9.03 -2.50 -0.15 
 (0.29) (-0.54) (0.74) (0.73) (-0.41) (-0.02) 
P5 (high) 30.10** -14.30 15.30** 15.60 8.78 2.79 





Table 9 Model-based abnormal returns of the portfolio of closed-end funds around month-end 
 
This table reports the NAV inflation pattern for Chinese closed-end funds around month-ends. The 
dependent variable 𝑋𝑚𝑓,𝑡 in each regression is the daily market-adjusted returns and the Carhart (1997) 
four-factor model-based daily abnormal returns of the VW portfolio of the Chinese closed-end funds: 
𝑋𝑚𝑓,𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑌𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑌𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 + 𝑎3𝑄𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝑎4𝑄𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 + 𝑎5𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 + 𝑎6𝑀𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 + 𝜀𝑚𝑓,𝑡 
The dependent variable 𝑋𝑚𝑓,𝑡 is regressed on the following binary indicator variables: 𝑌𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 is one 
when 𝑡 is the last two trading days of December; 𝑌𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡  is one when 𝑡 is the first two trading days 
of January; 𝑄𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡  is one when 𝑡  is the final two trading days of March, June, or September; 
𝑄𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡  is one when t is the first two trading days of April, July, or October; 𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑡 is one when t is 
the final two trading days of any other month but not the last of a quarter; and 𝑀𝐵𝐸𝐺𝑡 is one when t is 
the first two trading days of any other month but not the first of a quarter. The returns are shown in 
basis points. The number of Chinese closed-end funds is 88. Each regression has 1489 daily return 
observations ranging from January 2, 2004, to December 31, 2013. The t-statistics are shown in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
  a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 
Market 
adjusted 
      
Coefficient 92.60** 65.90 46.40 -9.10 10.30 24.80 
t-Value (2.41) (1.07) (1.62) (-0.31) (0.60) (1.41) 
Carhart       
Coefficient 5.38* -95.40 7.50** 0.12 1.81 5.32 









In comparison with well-developed markets, the mutual fund industry in China has a shorter history. 
The first closed-end funds and mutual funds in China were established in March 1998 and September 
2001, respectively. Although the sector is growing rapidly, the number of funds available on the market 
is far fewer than the 3,490 funds in the US market (e.g., Brown et al., 2017).30 The mutual fund industry 
in China has expanded in recent years, but its scale is far smaller than that of the US market (which was 
more than $10 trillion in 2013 and thus has great growth potential to meet investor demands.31 Despite 
China’s weak legal and financial systems, its economy is one of the fastest growing in the world (Allen 
et al., 2005). The AUM are expected to increase to 24 trillion yuan by 2020, at which point China will 
become the second-largest fund management market, following Japan, in Asian markets, indicating 
enormous opportunities for both Chinese and foreign mutual fund managers.32 
  
                                                          
30 See the Investment Company Institute Yearbook at ici.org. 
31 See the Investment Company Institute Yearbook at ici.org. 









Disclosure Requirements of Fund Portfolio Holdings in China 
The CSRC issued Securities Investment Fund Information Disclosure in July 2004. In addition to 
semiannual and annual reports, fund managers are required to file quarterly reports in the first and third 
fiscal quarters, within 15 days of the quarter-ends. The quarterly report should also include, for example, 
the combination of fund assets, the stock portfolio by industry, the bond portfolio classified by bond 
types, and the details of the top 10 stocks and top five bonds in fund portfolios according to the 
proportion of the market value of the NAV. Distinct from the disclosure information required by the 
quarterly report, fund managers must disclose in the semiannual and annual reports their complete 
portfolio holdings for the second and fourth fiscal quarters, with a delay up to 60 days and 90 days 
following the quarter-ends, respectively. Moreover, a fund should include significant changes in equity 
portfolio holdings during the report period in the semiannual and annual reports. 
 
